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Abstract 
The high volatility of electricity markets gives producers and retailers an incentive to hedge their 
exposure to electricity prices by buying and selling derivatives. This paper studies how welfare and 
investment incentives are affected when markets for derivatives are introduced, and to what extent this 
depends on market completeness. We develop an equilibrium model of the electricity market with risk-
averse firms and a set of traded financial products, more specifically: forwards and an increasing number 
of options. Using this model, we first show that aggregate welfare in the market increases with the 
number of derivatives offered. If firms are concerned with large negative shocks to their profitability due 
to liquidity constraints, option markets are particularly attractive from a welfare point of view. Secondly, 
we demonstrate that increasing the number of derivatives improves investment decisions of small firms 
(especially when firms are risk-averse), because the additional financial markets signal to firms how they 
can reduce the overall sector risk. Also the information content of prices increases: the quality of 
investment decisions based on risk-free probabilities, inferred from market prices, improves as markets 
become more complete Finally, we show that government intervention may be needed, because private 
investors may not have the right incentives to create the optimal number of markets. 
                                                 
1 The authors would like to thank the participants of the workshop on "Policymaking Benefits and 
Limitations from Using Financial Methods and Modelling in Electricity Markets" in Oxford (July 2008) 
for the insightful discussion. Special thanks to the discussant Thomas Tangerås, as well as to two 
anonymous reviewers.    2
1  Introduction 
The electricity sector has been subject to major structural changes during the last 
decade. Liberalization policies all over the world required a separation of formerly 
vertically integrated monopolies into three parts: production, retail and network 
services. Network services are a natural monopoly and should remain regulated. 
Introducing competition is possible at the level of production and retail. In this paper we 
look at competition at the production level and the retail level, while assuming that 
prices in the retail market remain fixed in the short run.  
The product electricity has special characteristics which greatly affects the way 
electricity markets are organized. Electrical energy cannot be stored economically, and 
therefore has to be produced the moment it is consumed. Intertemporal arbitrage is 
impossible, and the price for electricity is determined by the supply and demand 
conditions at each given hour. As demand for electrical energy is very inelastic and of a 
stochastic nature and generators face production capacity constraints, spot prices are 
very volatile.  
Liberalized electricity markets are therefore typically organized around regional spot 
markets for energy, which determine hourly spot prices, complemented with markets 
for long term contracts, which help coordinate the actions of the players and hedge 
volume and price risks. The extent to which a firm can hedge its exposure, depends on 
the availability of markets, their liquidity (determined by such parameters as trading 
volume and bid-ask spread), and the presence of speculators who can absorb part of the 
risk. These factors change as markets evolve from pure OTC to sophisticated spot and 
futures markets, and to more complete markets in which there is a liquid trade of a 
broad set of derivatives
2. 
The objective of this paper is to analyze the effect of market completeness on welfare 
and on investment incentives. Market completeness is measured as the number of 
electricity options available to producers and retailers, in addition to a forward contract. 
                                                 
2 Vertical integration of electricity production and retail is an alternative way of creating a "complete" set 
of hedging instruments between production and retail.   3
Indeed, as more options with different strike prices become available, firms obtain more 
instruments to trade risks and markets become more complete.
3 
This paper develops an equilibrium model of the electricity market, which includes the 
production process, the spot market trades and the trade of derivatives. The model is 
calibrated on the German electricity market. First, the results show that adding option 
markets is welfare-enhancing, but that most of the benefits are obtained with one to 
three options. In particular, if firms have strong aversion of negative shocks (shocks that 
would cause firm bankruptcy), then option contracts are needed to prevent retailers to 
go bankrupt, and welfare to be destroyed. Second, we analyze how investment decisions 
by small firms are affected when an increasing number of derivatives are traded. We 
show that investment decisions are improved when more derivatives are traded, 
especially when firms get more risk averse. The reason is that financial markets signal 
to new entrants how they can reduce the overall sector risk, and at the same time, they 
allow entrants to extract some of those sector-wide benefits. The amount of information 
that is contained in the equilibrium market prices, increases with the number of 
financial product being traded: it is shown that the quality of investment decisions that 
are based on risk-free probabilities inferred from market prices, improves with the 
number of contracts being traded. 
Finally, we show that government intervention may be needed, because private 
investors do not have the right incentives to create the optimal number of markets. 
Indeed, adding additional derivatives may reduce broker revenue from previously 
existing contracts, despite being overall welfare-improving. 
A side result of the model is that it shows how prices and price volatility are driven by 
the underlying market fundamentals, i.e. cost characteristics and demand uncertainty. 
The results of the model are complementary to the classical valuation models for 
financial derivatives. Classical models assume that the prices of the underlying asset 
follow some stochastic process and that a risk free portfolio can be built using delta 
hedging to price the derivative. Here we explain how price volatility is driven by the 
                                                 
3 The paper assumes that demand shocks are the only cause of risk. Theoretically the market is then 
complete, if options at every strike price can be traded. However if there are also firm specific shocks, 
then additional derivatives should be added for the market to be complete.    4
market dynamics. The advantage of our approach is that pricing of all products will be 
consistent with the overall industry behavior and with the underlying physical reality.  
The paper is organized as follows. First, section 2 provides an overview of relevant 
research on incomplete markets (including the applicability to electricity markets). 
Next, section 3 describes the electricity market model that is used to obtain the results 
of this paper, while section 4 describes the model data. Section 5 verifies the welfare 
effects of an increasing number of markets. Sections 6 and 7 analyzes the effect on 
investment incentives, based on welfare considerations (section 6) and on risk-free 
probabilities, i.e. the 'finance approach" (section 7), respectively. Section 8 describes 
practical conditions for financial innovations, and finally, section 9 summarizes our 
conclusions. 
 
2  Literature review 
The topic of this paper is closely related with the literature on incomplete markets and 
financial innovation, as well as with literature on hedging in electricity markets. In this 
section we first introduce the concept of incomplete markets. Next, we discuss the main 
results of the literature. Then, we highlight the relevance for electricity markets. Finally, 
we discuss related work on hedging in electricity markets. We base our discussion on 
market completeness mainly on (Staum, 2008) and (Duffie and Rahi, 1995). 
 
2.1  Incomplete markets 
Markets are incomplete when perfect risk transfer between the agents is impossible. 
There might be several reasons why this is the case. First, it might be that the marketed 
set of assets is insufficient to hedge the class of risk one wishes to hedge. This type of 
incompleteness deals with the spanning role of securities. See also (Allen and Gale, 
1994).  
Second, markets might be imperfect due to the existence of transaction costs and/or 
trading constraints. For instance, firms might not be able to take a short position in a 
traded security. These costs and/or constraints make it effectively impossibly to transfer 
risk perfectly.    5
In our paper we focus on the first type of market incompleteness: the missing markets 
problem.  
In practice, markets are never complete, as not all risk factors are traded on a market. 
Hence, when might market incompleteness be relevant for hedging or pricing decisions? 
We mention two situations in which this might be the case. The first situation is when 
some of variables that one would like to hedge are derived from non-market prices, 
such as for weather derivatives. Another typical situation of market incompleteness 
occurs when the price of an asset does not follow a standard random walk process – 
where prices changes are ‘infinitesimally small’ – but contains ‘large’ price jumps. The 
problem with price jumps is that a hedging strategy where one dynamically adjusts a 
portfolio containing the risk-free asset and the asset itself is no longer possible, as the 
payout is non-linear in the size of the shock. In order to complete the market one would 
need to add a forward market and a set of option markets with different strike prices.  
 
2.2  Research results on incompleteness 
The main results of the literature on incomplete markets with respect to the welfare 
effects of additional markets and the pricing of these assets are the following.
4  
Welfare in an incomplete market is lower than in a complete market because not all risk 
is perfectly allocated in the market. This is a rather intuitive result: as in an incomplete 
market not all potential gains from trade are exhausted, total welfare can be improved 
by a sufficient number of additional markets until the market is complete. This simple 
intuition does, however, not carry over to situations where only one additional market is 
added to the economy, which does not complete the market. (Hart, 1975) shows that 
adding a financial product might make every one in the economy worse off. Extending 
this result, (Elul, 1995) and (Cass and Citanna, 1998) show that in an economy with 
                                                 
4 In this paper we assume that a Walrasian equilibrium exists, even when markets are incomplete. In a 
general equilibrium setting with multiple goods, (where securities can contain different bundles of 
goods), this is not guaranteed. However, when we restrict ourselves to economies where financial claims 
only have a pay-off in terms of a single numeraire good, existence is satisfied. On existence of equilibria 
in a general equilibrium setting see (Duffie and Shafer, 1985) and (Duffie and Shafer, 1986).   6
many consumption goods one can always find an asset that makes everyone worse off, 
or an asset that makes everyone better off, or an asset that makes any combination of 
individuals better or worse off.
5 Based on (Diamond, 1967) however, one can conclude 
that this does not hold for single-good incomplete markets, since they are constrained 
suboptimal. In particular, this applies to the typical situation of financial markets, in 
which money is the single relevant good (this will also be the case in this paper: adding 
products always increases welfare). To create the conditions required by (Elul, 1995) 
and (Cass and Citanna, 1998) one would need to introduce multiple independent time 
periods, or assume that firms obtain a utility from a commodity per se (e.g., a 
"convenience yield"). Note that introducing all financial assets (completing the market) 
does not necessarily make everyone better off. Complete markets are Pareto efficient, 
but not necessarily Pareto dominant with all possible incomplete market allocations. 
(Willen, 2005) studies the impact of market innovation in more detail and shows that, 
when agents have exponential utility and with normally distributed risks, the effect of a 
financial innovation can be split up in a portfolio effect and a price effect. (Elul, 1999) 
studies the welfare effects of a financial innovation in a single-good market. 
(Boyle and Wang, 2001) study the pricing of a new derivative in an incomplete market. 
They show that one should not use the standard arbitrage assumptions typically used in 
the financial (engineering) literature, as the prices of existing assets will change once a 
new asset is added to the economy.
6 Instead, they recommend to make explicit 
assumptions on the preferences of the agents in the economy and to use an equilibrium 
model to derive the prices of the different assets. (Staum, 2008) and (Carr et al., 2001) 
argue however that results of equilibrium models depend very much on the choice of 
the utility function, the initial endowment of the firms, and the parameters of the 
probability measure, and are therefore not useful for trading decisions.  
 
                                                 
5 Similar results were earlier obtained by (Milne and Shefrin, 1987) in a specific model specification. 
6 They also show that the condition of arbitrage-free pricing does not determine a unique price for the 
newly created asset.   7
2.3  Incompleteness of electricity markets 
Given the technical characteristics of the electricity system we described above, spot 
prices for electrical energy are not only very volatile, but electricity markets are 
typically also very incomplete. Hence, the risks are large and hard to hedge as not all 
financial contracts that span the market are traded.  
As electricity cannot be stored, standard models for the pricing of forward contracts 
which rely on inter-temporal arbitrage and cost-of-carry models cannot be used. Instead, 
one has to rely on equilibrium models of the market and to make assumption about the 
relative risk aversion of the agents to derive predictions for the pricing of the goods. 
Bessembinder and Lemon (2002) develop such a model for the electricity market.
7  
Stochastic demand and supply shocks caused by weather changes or plant outages, lead 
to large jumps in equilibrium price and equilibrium demand levels. As a result of price 
and quantity jumps, firms are unable to hedge their full portfolio by only trading in 
forward markets and spot market. Instead, they should rely on trading option contracts 
with several strike prices, or vertical integration of generation and retail activities. 
Hence a full set of option contracts is needed to complete the market. 
 
2.4  Hedging in electricity markets 
This paper builds further upon existing studies on contracting and hedging in electricity 
markets, which we review now. In the review we limit ourselves – with one exception – 
to studies that rely on equilibrium models of the electricity market.
8  
(Bessembinder and Lemmon, 2002) develop a partial equilibrium model of the spot 
market and one forward market. They derive analytical solutions for forward and spot 
prices in a setting where firms are risk averse, production cost are convex, retail prices 
                                                 
7 Even tough storage of electrical energy is very expensive; one can still rely on arbitrage principle for 
pricing electricity forwards when there is a liquid forward market for natural gas and a liquid market for 
generation capacity able to convert natural gas in electricity. The lack of the latter market makes this 
strategy impossible. 
8 The alternative to equilibrium models is the study of one firm’s contracting and production decisions for 
a exogenously given stochastic spot price process and forward price.    8
are fixed and demand is stochastic. Their theoretical predictions on risk premia are 
verified empirically: the model correctly predicts when markets should be in 
backwardation or in contango. 
Our paper extends the framework of (Bessembinder and Lemmon, 2002) and allows for 
multiple financial products to be traded – not just one forward contract
9. It further 
analyzes the effects of speculators trading in a number of derivatives markets and 
studies alternative, more realistic formulations of risk aversion.  
The usefulness of financial instruments other than forwards to hedge risks in electricity 
markets is discussed by (Oum et al., 2006). They show that a regulated retail firm can 
use a combination of forwards, call and put options to hedge its volumetric risk, and 
draw attention to the regulated firm’s difficulty to hedge, when regulators might forbid 
trade in derivatives which look speculative such as weather derivatives and rebuff 
contracting positions that require the firm to pay a sum ex-ante. The optimal hedging 
strategy is found by optimizing the firm’s utility, subjective to the financing constraint. 
The results are derived for the CARA and the mean-variance utility functions, with an 
endogenously given price and quantity distribution function. In our paper we develop an 
equilibrium model of the market and show that option contracts are important 
instrument to transfer volumetric risks from generators to retailers, even more so when 
firms might face liquidity constraints.   
(Von Der Fehr, 2007) study vertical integration, forward contracting and hedging in an 
equilibrium electricity market model. They show that vertical integration might increase 
the equilibrium risk premia in the market and lower overall welfare, compared with 
forward contracting. The reason why this happens in their model is that it assumed that 
a vertically merged firm has a “smaller capacity” to take up risk than two separate 
entities. In our model we also represent vertical integration, but assume that a vertical 
integrated firm has the “same capacity” to take up risk than two separate companies. To 
our opinion, this is a more realistic assumption. We see the difference between vertical 
integration and contracting by means of a forward contract, as follows: Within the 
                                                 
9 With a forward contract this paper refers to a contract for future delivery of a fixed quantity of a good 
and a fixed price. We will not explicitly specify whether these contracts are traded over the counter 
(OTC), or whether they are traded as ‘futures’ on a centralized power exchange.    9
vertical integrated firm risk sharing between generation and retail is perfect, while risk 
sharing by trading forward contracts is imperfect, leaving part of the risk untraded.  
Also (Aid et al., 2006) study vertical integration, forward contracting, hedging, and 
retail competition.  They develop an equilibrium model where firms have a mean-
variance utility function and show that both vertical integration and forward contracting 
allows for a better risk sharing between retailers and generators and leads to lower retail 
prices, increased market share for small generators, and a reduction of the profits of 
retailers.  Compared with long term contracts, vertical integration leads to perfect risk 
sharing between generators and retailers. Additionally, forward markets might not 
develop under some parameters of the game in which case no risk is shared between 
upstream and downstream firms.  The results of (Aid et al., 2006) on the comparison of 
vertical integration and forward contracting are driven by the change of the utility 
function (and the implied capacity of firms to take-up risks) and the quality of risk 
transfer between upstream and downstream firms (market completeness). In our paper 
we single out the effect of market completeness. We do not, however, study retail 
competition.  
Our paper assumes perfect competitive market and neglect strategic issues associated 
with long-term contracting that have been reported in the literature.  
(Allaz and Vila, 1993) study the role of forward contracts, not as a tool to hedge risks, 
but as an instrument used by oligopolist to strategically affect market outcomes. It is 
shown that in a Cournot setting, generation firms will sell forward contracts in order to 
commit to compete more aggressively in the spot market. Hence forward contracts 
make markets more competitive. (Willems, 2006) shows that a similar mechanism is at 
work with financial call options: the market equilibrium is even more competitive than 
with future contracts.  
(Green, 2003) studies the combined hedging and strategic roles of forward contracts 
while at the same time examining different types of competition in the retail market. He 
shows that retail competition might lower the amount of forward contracts firms will 
sign. The current paper does not allow for retail competition, -- consumers cannot 
switch retail supplier -- and assumes, as in (Bessembinder and Lemmon, 2002), that 
retail prices are fixed.    10
Our paper does not model relation between market completeness and the investment 
decisions of the generation firms. This remains a topic for future study. (Green, 2007) 
models investment decisions and the technology choice in a long-term oligopolistic 
equilibrium model with risk averse firms in which firms can sign forward contracts.  
 
3  Model description 
We extend the competitive market equilibrium model of the forward and spot markets 
developed by (Bessembinder and Lemmon, 2002). The main difference with their 
model is that we allow for multiple financial products to be traded on the market. We 
start with a description of the spot market and continue with a description of the 
forward markets.  
Demand for electricity D is inelastic and stochastic. The total production costs of the 
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where  , Fa  and c are parameters that determine the shape of the cost function.  
The spot market is perfectly competitive, and the wholesale price for electricity P  is 
determined by market clearing.  
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As demand is random, also the spot price is a random variable.  
The generator’s profit is equal to spot market revenue minus production costs:  
  () g PD CD π = ⋅−  (3) 
Retailers buy the energy on the spot market and sell their energy at a regulated retail 
rate R  to consumers. Their profit is equal to:  
 () r R PD π = −  (4) 
Both retailers and generators’ profit are affected by the stochastic nature of demand. 
In the forward market, a derivative  {1,.., } iI ∈  is traded at a price  i F  which promises a 
payment ( ) i TP which is conditional on the spot price P . This paper assumes that the 
only derivatives which are traded are call options. Hence:    11
 () m a x ( , 0 ) ii TP P S = −  (5) 
with  i S  the strike price of option i.  
The total profit  j Π  that a firm  , j rg =  makes when it buys  
j
i k  derivatives in the 
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The firm’s profit is the sum of the profit it makes in the spot market, and the profit it 
makes on the derivatives it has bought. Both terms are stochastic as they depend on the 
realization of the demand level.  
We assume that the retailers and generators are risk averse, and that their utility can be 
described by profit - variance utility with a risk aversion parameter  A:  




jr g U == Π − Π  (7) 
The risk aversion parameter  A measures the risk aversion of the generator and the retail 
sector as a whole, which we assume to be identical across sectors.
10  
In the contracting stage, firm  j  will maximize its utility  j U , by choosing the amount of 
derivatives  1 ,..., ,...,
jjj
iI kkk  it will buy. The equilibrium quantities contract positions are 



















, the vector of equilibrium quantities bought by player  j , 
Cov{ , } TT Σ=
GG
 the I  by I  covariance matrix of the contracts  1 ( ,..., ) I TTT =
G
, 
1 ( ,..., ) I F FF =
G
 the derivative price vector, and Cov{ , } j T π
G
 the 1 by I  covariance 
matrix of contracts and firm  j ’s profit.  
Equation (8) shows that the amount of contracts firm  j  buys is the sum of two terms. 
The first term is the pure speculative amount of contracts a firm would like to buy. If a 
                                                 
10 If there are N identical firms in the generation sector, then each of the firms own 1/Nth of the 
generation capacity, and has a risk aversion parameter equal to nA.   12
financial derivative has an expected positive return, then the firm will buy some of it, as 
long as it does not increase the variance of its portfolio too much. The second term is 
the pure hedging demand by the firm. A firm  j  will buy derivatives in order to hedge 
its profit risk. It will buy more of a certain derivative, if it is more correlated with the 
profit it wants to hedge, and if the impact on the variance of the portfolio is smaller.  
In equilibrium the demand and supply of derivative products should be equal. Hence, if 
there are no speculators active in the market iwe find:  
  0
rg
ii kk + =  (9) 
and using equation (8) the equilibrium price of derivative i is given by  
  E( ) Cov{ , }
2
ii g r i
A
FT T ππ =− +  (10) 
Hence, the price of a derivative is equal to expected pay-off of the derivative minus a 
term which reflects that the derivative is used to hedge the risk of the individual firms. 
The last term depends on the risk aversion of all the firms and the covariance of 
industry profit with financial instrument i.  
It is worth noting that the price of the derivative does not depend on the amount of 
products which are traded in the market.
11  
If there are risk neutral speculators active in derivatives market i, the risk premiums 
become zero, and we find that the price of the derivative should be equal to the 
expected value of the derivative: 
 E( ) ii FT =  (11) 
4   Model data 
The model is loosely calibrated on the German electricity market. Demand is assumed 
to be normally distributed with a mean of 60 GW and a standard deviation of 17 GW.  
The parameters of the aggregate production cost function are  4 c = , 
-4 1.852 10 a =  
where price, quantities, and profits are expressed in (EUR/MWh), (GWh), and (1000 
                                                 
11 In standard mean-variance settings risk pricing is not affected. Specifically, in quadratic or CARA-
normal economies, the price of any risky security relative to the bond is unaffected by changes in the 
span. See (Oh, 1996).    13































Figure 1: Industry marginal cost 
 
Retailers and generators have the same risk aversion parameter  0.0025  A = which has 
the unit (h/ 1000 EUR).  
Given the assumption on the supply and the demand side we can derive the wholesale 
price distribution. The distribution has a mean of 48 EUR/MWh and a standard 
deviation of 35 EUR/MWh. (Bessembinder and Lemmon, 2002) show that as the 
industry marginal cost function is convex, the price distribution is skewed, which can 

































Figure 2: Wholesale price distribution 
 
Further, we assume that the fixed cost parameter  1200 F = , and that retailers sell their 
energy at a fixed price of 58 EUR/MWh.   14
5  Welfare effects 
In this section, we use the model to calculate the optimal hedging strategy of the 
generator and the retailers, and analyze the welfare effects of adding additional 
derivatives to the market. In the first part of the simulations we assume that there are no 
speculators active on the market, and the supply and demand of financial contracts 
comes only from retailers and generators. We consider four scenarios with a different 
number of derivative markets present. In the first scenario, only a forward market exists. 
In the second through fourth scenario, the forward market is supplemented with one, 
three, and eleven additional option markets, respectively.
12  
Table 1 shows the simulation results for all scenarios. It shows for each of the twelve 
derivative contracts, the net amount traded by generators and retailers. The option 
contracts have strike prices ranging from 0 to 143 EUR / MWh, where the zero strike 
price corresponds to the forward contract. 
 




Forward + 1 
Option
Forward + 3 
Options All Contracts
1 0 -45.3 68.0 52.0 32.1 -5.3
2 13 -33.6 37.9
3 26 -25.2 16.2
4 39 -19.1 37.7 11.1
5 52 -14.5 8.3
6 65 -10.9 6.9
7 78 -7.9 45.4 15.9 5.9
8 91 -5.6 5.2
9 104 -3.8 4.3
10 117 -2.4 14.5 6.6
11 130 -1.3 -3.7
12 143 -0.7 13.1
Welfare 768.4 1224.1 1321.7 1337.0
Contract
 
Table 1: Market equilibrium without speculation 
 
The results show that if there are only forward contracts, generators will over hedge 
their position. They sell 68 GW forward, while in expected terms they will only sell 60 
                                                 
12 The numerical model is written as a Mixed Complementarity Problem (MCP) in Gams. See Appendix 
A.   15
GW. The reason for this is that the generators and retailers want to hedge their quantity 
risk, and as price and quantity are positively correlated, they can do this by selling, 
respectively buying more contracts. The price of the forward contract is 45.3 
EUR/MWh, which is below the expected price of 48 EUR/MWh in the market.  
In scenarios 2 to 4, extra financial instruments are added to the market. Table 1 shows 
that once more instruments become available, generators will reduce the amounts of 
standard forward contract they sell and substitute these contracts with option contracts. 
The generator and the retailer reduce their supply and demand of forward contracts. 
Although both demand and supply functions shift, the price of the forward contract 
remains 45.3 EUR/MWh as shown in derivation (10).  
The last row in Table 1 is the aggregate market welfare, measured in certainty 
equivalents (1000 EUR/h). Increasing the number of contracts traded clearly increases 
market efficiency. The introduction of one option contract, when none existed before, 
increases welfare with approximately 50 %. Adding extra markets for option contracts 
increases welfare, but to a lower extent. For instance, increasing the number of option 
markets from 3 to 11, increases welfare by 1.2  %. Hence risk sharing between 
generation and retail is close to optimal once a few option contracts are traded.  
 
For the second part of the simulations, we assume that speculators can actively 
participate in the market, by taking positions in the electricity derivative markets and 
financially closing their position in the spot market. We assume they will trade away the 
risk premia in the market: the price of the derivatives becomes equal to the expected 
value of the derivative. As speculators provide extra liquidity to the market, the supply 
of derivatives by generators does no longer need to exactly balance the demand by 
retailers. The difference of generators’ supply and retailers’ demand is the position 
speculators take in the market. For the same four scenarios as before, Table 2 gives the 
net position of generators and retailers. In scenario 1, only forward contracts exist, and 
generators sell 69.1 GWh forward, retailers buy 67 GWh, and speculators buy 2.1 GWh. 
The results indicate that, the more derivative markets are introduced, the larger the gap 
between the supply and the demand for forward contracts, and the larger the role played 
by speculators. In scenario four, in which there are one forward market and eleven   16
option markets, generators sell 34.2 GWh, retailers sell 44.8 GWh and speculators buy 
79 GWh.  
The introduction of speculators increases welfare, as the players can share their risk 
with players outside the market, the speculators. Hence, the addition of speculators does 
not change our previous conclusions. Speculators play an active role in the electricity 
market by taking up market risk and by decreasing the risk premia in the market. As the 
number of markets increases, the amount of risk that the speculators take away from 
market participants increases, but the positive welfare effect of additional markets levels 
off after a few products. 
Price Net Contract Position
Nr
Strike 
Price Forward All Contracts
1 0 -48.4 69.1 67.0 58.7 45.3 48.0 16.2 34.2 -44.8
2 13 -36.0 13.2 62.6
3 26 -25.9 8.8 23.6
4 39 -18.1 20.5 55.0 6.6 15.7
5 52 -12.4 5.5 11.2
6 65 -8.3 4.7 9.1
7 78 -5.5 29.3 61.5 12.2 19.7 4.2 7.6
8 91 -3.5 3.8 6.6
9 104 -2.1 3.2 5.4
10 117 -1.2 10.5 18.4 4.9 8.2
11 130 -0.7 -2.7 -4.7
12 143 -0.3 9.9 16.4
Welfare 771.6




Forward + 1 
Option
 
Table 2: Market equilibrium with speculation 
 
Finally, we repeated the last simulation with a different assumption for firms' utility 
functions: instead of the utility functions of equation (7), we used the well-known 
CRRA utility function (i.e., the utility function with constant relative risk aversion). As 
a result of the CRRA property, firms become very averse of potential shocks that would 
lead to very low or negative profits. In other words, the CRRA utility function models a 
world in which firms want to avoid the risk of liquidity problems or bankruptcy. 
Practically, we chose the coefficient of relative risk aversion to be 4 (i.e., in the middle 
of the typical 2-6 range).
13 The simulation results with speculation and CRRA utility 
                                                 
13 Before applying the CRRA utility function, a shift of 1 million EUR/h was introduced, to model the 
effect that limited negative profits do not lead to immediate bankruptcy.   17
functions for producers and retailers are shown in Table 3. Generally speaking, the 
results are very similar to the results of Table 2, although the retailer seems to have a 
slightly increased preference for options over forwards (as compared to Table 2). 
The most interesting observation is that with the CRRA utility function, it is not 
possible to find a sufficiently hedged solution in case only forwards are present. In other 
words, if no options are introduced, welfare remains "infinitely low" for CRRA utility 
functions. The reason is that forwards alone do not allow the retailer and the generator 
to limit their exposure in all "states-of-the-world". The intuition for this is the 
following: since a negative result in one potential state-of-the-world is strongly 
penalized by the CRRA function, the retailer and the generator would like to avoid – at 
all costs – any outcomes in which their profit is below a certain threshold, in order to 
avoid bankruptcy. The retailer faces a negative shock when demand is high (he faces a 
high wholesale price, and has to buy a large volume of power), and when demand is low 
(its sales volume is too low to cover fixed costs). The generator faces a negative shock 
when demand is very low (low volume and low volume of trade). As the retailer wants 
to avoid bankruptcy at all cost, its demand for forward contracts is undetermined for 
any quantity or price of forward contracts – at least within the price range that the 
generator can offer. Based on these results for a CRRA utility function, it is clear that 
the introduction of options is especially welfare-enhancing if there is a strong risk-
aversion for negative shocks that could lead to bankruptcy. 
Price Net Contract Position
Nr
Strike 
Price Forward All Contracts
1 0 -48.4 No solution 58.8 38.7 48.1 11.3 33.5 -45.8
2 13 -36.0 13.4 63.6
3 26 -25.9 10.8 23.7
4 39 -18.1 20.5 59.6 0.0 15.7
5 52 -12.4 18.7 11.2
6 65 -8.3 -6.1 9.1
7 78 -5.5 29.3 63.8 12.1 20.2 3.7 7.9
8 91 -3.5 3.8 5.6
9 104 -2.1 9.9 9.4
10 117 -1.2 10.5 18.2 2.5 -9.6
11 130 -0.7 7.3 49.6
12 143 -0.3 -10.4 -47.0
Welfare
Contract
Forward + 1 
Option
"-∞"
Forward + 3 
Options
-1215.9 -314.1 -349.3  
Table 3: Market equilibrium with speculation, with CRRA utility functions   18
 
6  Investment decisions by small firms 
Above we have shown that the welfare effect of adding contracts levels off after a 
relatively small number of contracts. However, implicitly we have assumed that the 
production firms have a diversified portfolio of generation plants. If some firms had 
only base load power plants and other firms had only peak load power plants, the social 
value of financial contracts could be higher. 
In order to test the impact of the number of financial contracts on firms with different 
types of portfolio, we will calculate whether a small firm would invest in a single power 
plant with a marginal cost c, and fixed investment cost  F . This small firm is assumed 
to be risk averse, with expectation-variance utility function (as in the first part of our 
simulations). We will assume no speculators in the market. 
The firm will invest in this production plant when the investment increases its expected 
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The firm will invest as long as  
  (, ) NI INV UU c F ≥  (14) 
Equation (14) defines implicitly the maximal fixed cost for which the generator would 
willing to invest in new generation capacity with marginal cost c . Hence investment 
will occur as long as  
  () cr F Fc <  (15) 
Equation (15) describes the investment decision of the firm.    19
Given that the firms are risk averse, the investment decision is different from the 
standard NPV rule. A-risk neutral firm would invest as long as fixed costs are below the 
NPV of the investment:  
  () E { m a x ( , 0 ) } FN P V c P c <= −  (16) 
Note that the investment decision of the firm depends on the number of contracts traded 
in the market. As more contracts are traded, the firm is able to better hedge the output of 
the production plant and reduce its risks. This makes it more interesting for the firm to 
build the power plant.  
Figure 3 compares the optimal decision of the risk averse firm with the standard NPV 
approach. Note that the firm's risk aversion is chosen at a higher level than before, 
because we analyze a small firm and the expectation-variance utility function does not 
scale. The figure shows the ratio of the NPV value of the power plant and the “risk 






κ =  (17) 
If  1 κ < , the firm will invest less in generation than predicted by the NPV approach, as 
the firm wants to be compensated for the risk it is taking in the market. If  1 κ >  the firms 
are willing to invest more often than as predicted by the NPV value. The reason for this 
is that those firms lower the overall risk in the industry, for which they are compensated 
by the rest of the industry, as they receive a premium for their output.   20
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Figure 3: Optimal investment decisions. 
Figure 3 shows that if no financial contracts are traded, firms will invest less in the 
generation assets than under the NPV rule. The reason for this is that investments are 
risky, and therefore they are only undertaken if they provide a premium profit. The 
effect of additional contracts on the investment decisions of peak-load power plants and 
base-load power plants is, however, very different. 
Once the forward contracts is introduced, a firm with a base load plant ( 0 c ≈ ) would be 
able to completely hedge its position. However, hedging comes at a cost, which is 
reflected in the fact that  1 κ < . Adding additional derivatives to the market does not 
change the investment decisions of the base load power plant, as the firm already has 
perfect information in evaluating the value of the power plant using the forward 
contracts. Speculation and investment decisions are decoupled. 
For peak load plants (c large), the results are quite different. Once the forward markets 
are present (and no options), less is invested in peak load power plants. The reason for 
this is that it is often more profitable for the firm to speculate on the forward markets 
(without building a power plant), than to build a power plant and use financial contracts 
to hedge its portfolio. Hence, financial investments crowd-out the investments in 
physical assets; i.e. investment and speculation decisions are coupled. As more and   21
more contracts are introduced, we see that investment in peak generation increases 
dramatically. The reasons are two-fold. On the one hand, there are better instruments to 
hedge the risk of the production output of the firm. As a result, the investment decision 
and the speculation decision become decoupled. On the other hand, the peak load power 
plants reduce the risk of the sector. For this they are refunded through a price premium 
for their product. As a result of this effect, investments in peak-load plants are higher 
than under a pure NPV reasoning without contracts, an interesting result. The figure 
also shows that for the technology with production costs approximately equal to 80, 
adding additional markets on top of market 7 does not change the results. Contract 7 has 
a strike price of approximately 80 EUR/MWh, hence the investment valuation of the 
firm is perfect. 
Figure 4 gives the optimal investments decisions with more risk averse firms. It shows 
that as we increase the risk aversion of the firms, the effects are amplified. Comparing 
Figure 3 and Figure 4, (note the difference in scale) it can be observed that as the 
number of contracts increases, the effect of risk aversion decreases. In the limit when all 
financial contracts are traded, the optimal investment decisions no longer depend on the 
risk aversion of the firm. The reason for this is that the investment decision and the 
speculation decision are decoupled: the production plant can be valued using the prices 
of the financial products in the market (perfect hedging is almost possible), and the 
amount of speculation depends on the risk parameters of the firm.   22
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Figure 4: Optimal investment decisions with larger risk aversion parameter. 
 
7  Information content of derivatives prices: risk-free probabilities 
In the previous section, we studied the effect of financial contracts on the investment 
decisions of a firm as a function of its risk aversion parameter and the technology 
parameter  c. In this section we look at the information content contained in the prices 
of financial products, and derive optimal investment decisions based upon a typical 
financial approach using risk-free probabilities. This approach uses the price data of the 
financial market to estimate the market value of an asset. The investment decision is 
made by comparing the market value of the asset with the investment costs of the asset. 
This approach assumes that the market is sufficiently complete to create a portfolio of 
contracts which recreates the pay-off of the physical asset. In this section we will test 
when the markets are sufficiently complete to use the risk-free probabilities approach by 
comparing the investment decisions in this section with the optimal decisions we found 
in the previous section. 
The market equilibria in Table 1 can be represented by means of a risk-free probability 
distribution  θ , different from the true distribution. Under the risk-free probability 
distribution, the contracts’ prices are equal to their expected values:    23
  E() TF θ =
G G
 (18) 
and the generator and the retailer act as risk neutral agents who optimize expected 
profit: 
 ,E ( ) j j jr g U θ == Π  (19) 
Figure 5 gives the risk-free probabilities for different assumptions regarding the number 
of products being traded
14. When all financial contracts are traded, the risk free 
probability distribution assumes that extreme events, especially low prices, are more 
likely to occur than they do in reality. When only forward contracts are traded, 
however, the risk free probabilities calculated on the basis of forward prices, give 
extreme events a too small probability. Adding just one extra financial market brings 
the distribution relatively close to the situation where all 12 financial products are 
traded, and greatly improves the information that firms receive.  
 



























Contracts 1 & 7
Contracts 1 to 12 
 
Figure 5: Risk free probabilities without speculators. 
                                                 
14 As the set of forward and option markets is incomplete, the risk-free probability distribution is not 
unique. We rely on ex-ante information about the probability measure to determine it. This paper chooses 
to minimize the ‘distance’ between the true-probability of an event occurring and the-risk free probability 
of the same event.   24
Firms should invest in a power plant when the expected Net Present Value, calculated 
using the risk free probabilities, is larger than the fixed investment cost. Hence a firm 
will invest if 
  () E{ m a x ( , 0 ) } FN P V c p c θθ <= −  (20) 
As in section 6 we will compare these critical values with  () NPV c , the net present value 
of a power plant with marginal cost c calculated using the true probabilities. Figure 6 
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Figure 6: Investment decisions using risk free probabilities.  
 
The results are very similar to those obtained in section 6. In order to see whether the 
information content is sufficient, we will compare the decisions of the risk-free 
probabilities model and the optimal decisions (as described in section 6). Figure 7 








=  (22)   25
Optimal Investment Decisions 
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Figure 7: Difference of the risk free probabilities approach and the optimal investments 
 
Figure 7 shows that if the marginal cost of the power plant is equal to the strike price of 
one of the options traded in the market, the two approaches produce identical results. In 
general, the error in using risk free probabilities is smaller when the contracts that are 
traded are better correlated with the power plant being built. Hence, the decisions to 
build base load power plants are always efficient when there is a forward contract. 
Similarly, if the market trades an option with a strike price very close to the marginal 
cost of a certain peak power plant, the investment decision for that power plant based on 
the risk-free probabilities is optimal. 
On the other hand, the risk-free probabilities approach leads to overinvestment in power 
plants for which no close financial substitutes are traded in the market. For example, if 
only forward contracts are available, the investment decision for a peak power plant can 
be seriously distorted. For the risk aversion parameter equal to 0.025, the firms make an 
error of more than 20% when evaluating this decision. The addition of one option 
contract eliminates this error for almost all types of power plants. In general, as more 
contracts are being traded, the risk free probabilities approach will lead to decisions that   26
are closer to the optimal decisions. If markets are complete, the two approaches yield 
identical results. 
For larger risk aversion parameters, the effects are enlarged (see Figure 8). However, 
the figure shows again that adding one option contract eliminates most of the bias in the 
investment decisions, although the difference might remain economically significant (5-
10% error). 
Optimal Investment Decisions 





0 2 04 06 08 0 1 0 0 1 2 0


























Contracts 1 & 7
Contracts 1 - 12
 
Figure 8: Difference of the risk free probabilities approach and the optimal investments 
 
8  Conditions for financial innovations 
The previous sections have shown that when electricity markets are made more 
complete, welfare increases, more information is transmitted, and firms are given 
incentives to build power plants which reduce overall sector risk. This in itself, 
however, does not guarantee that these markets will actually develop. There is a 
growing literature on financial innovations, i.e. the study of the creation of new 
securities. This body of the literature tries to understand the incentives of private actors 
to create new securities and compares their private incentives with the optimal type of 
financial contracts one should expect in the market. Strong predictions are not available, 
nevertheless some general rules could be derived (Duffie and Rahi, 1995).   27
Securities will only develop, when the underlying risk is sufficiently volatile, and the 
risk for the firms involved is substantial. Otherwise, the trade of the good will be too 
low, and the market will not develop. In the electricity market, price (and quantity) 
volatility is large and the effect on the firm’s profit is very large. Hedging risk by 
vertical integration, or by trading derivatives becomes very important.  
In order for a new financial market to be viable not only speculators should be present 
in the market, but also liquidity traders; i.e. participants which have a natural demand 
for hedging their positions. Markets in which only the only traders are speculators will 
not survive. In our model retailers and generators are the natural agents that have 
opposite risk exposure and who would like to trade their risk.  
For markets to be functioning well, information asymmetries between the seller and the 
buyer of the market should not be too large. In case the seller has private information 
about the value of the security, the market will not develop. Hence, there might be an 
“information constrained number of optimal markets” (second best amount of markets). 
Risk which is caused by demand shocks (or weather factors) might be traded more 
easily on the market than risk which can be influenced by specific players. For instance 
plant, outages might not be insurable in the market.  
If we assume that the (normalized) bid-ask spread is constant across markets, then the 
incentives for a broker to set-up a new market roughly depend on the volume of trade 
that he makes. The simulation results give us a qualitative impression of how market 
completeness affects the trading volumes for the different products. Adding extra 
markets increases the total volume which is traded. While it generally decreases trade in 
the products which were already traded before the market was, it might increase the 
participation of the speculators in some of the markets. Hence, the introduction of a 
security might create spillovers  to other, already existing markets. In general, the 
direction of this effect on the trading volume is not clear-cut. 
As an illustration of those spill-overs, Figure 9 discusses the incentives of a broker to 
introduce a new financial contract.
15 The results are simulated under the assumption that 
                                                 
15 The results are simulated under the assumption that all financial contracts in Table 1, except for contact 
number 6, are traded with a bid-ask spread of 0.50 EUR / MWh. The broker then decides to introduce 
contract number 6.   28
all financial contracts in Table 1 -- except for contact number 6-- are traded with a bid-
ask spread of 0.50 EUR/MWh. A broker now decides to introduce contract number 6 
and has to set its bid-ask spread. When the bid-ask spread is large, the product is not 
actively traded and revenue of the broker is zero on the contract. When the bid-ask 
spread decreases below 0.51 EUR/MWh, the product generates interest for generators 
and retailers as a hedging instrument. The broker maximizes its revenue on the contract 
when the bid-ask spread is equal to 0.38 EUR/MWh. Total welfare for generators and 
retailers would be maximized when the bid-ask spread is equal to zero. The introduction 
of the new contract has a negative spillover effect on the revenue that the other option 
contracts generate. Keeping the bid-ask spread of other contracts constant, total revenue 
over all contracts (existing and new) decreases after the introduction of the new 
contract.  
Spillovers can be negative, as in the example, or positive when financial products are 
seen as complements for the hedging firms. For instance, a retailer might be willing to 
simultaneously buy a put and a call option to create a virtual forward contract if the 
forward contract would not be traded as such.  
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Figure 9: Effect of introducing a new financial contract on revenue and welfare 
 
As a result of the spillovers, private investors may not have the right incentives to create 
a sufficiently complete set of markets, and government intervention may be needed to 
maximize welfare.   29
 
9  Conclusions 
This paper derives an equilibrium model for spot and derivative markets in electricity 
and evaluates the effects of market completeness on welfare and on investment 
incentives. 
With respect to welfare, the numerical results of the model (based on German market 
data) show that welfare is enhanced when options are offered in the market in addition 
to forward contracts. However, it turns out that most of the welfare benefits are 
achieved with 1 to 3 options. The need for options is especially relevant in case firms 
have a strong aversion of liquidity problems (bankruptcy risk): with a CRRA utility 
function, welfare is completely destroyed when no options are present. Allowing 
speculators to actively trade in the market, eliminates the risk premium, and increases 
aggregate welfare. The beneficial effect of speculators increases as more contracts are 
traded. 
With respect to investment incentives, financial contracts are important for signaling to 
entrants how they could reduce the overall sector risk. When no financial contracts are 
traded, risk-averse firms would tend to underinvest compared to an approach based on 
expected NPV. When forward contracts are traded, investment in base-load power 
plants increases (investment and speculation are decoupled), but investment in peak 
load plants declines because it is more attractive to speculate with forward contracts 
instead (investment and speculation are coupled). When options are added to the 
market, investment in peak power plants increases again dramatically (investment and 
speculation become more and more decoupled), even beyond the level predicted by 
expected NPV, because firms investing in peak power plants are rewarded by the 
market for reducing overall sector risk. In general, investment decisions improve with 
increasing market completeness because of decoupling of investment and speculation – 
however, as soon as a firm can trade a derivative that exactly matches the risk profile of 
its investment, the investment decision becomes independent of market completeness. 
The above results are amplified when firms are more risk-averse. 
When investment decisions are made based on a financial approach using risk-free 
probabilities, similar results are obtained. In fact, the results are identical for power   30
plants for which a perfectly matching contract is traded. However, for power plants for 
which no close financial proxy is traded in the markets, the results can be severely 
distorted compared to the approach above. As more and more options are added to the 
markets, the results converge again, to become identical when markets are complete. 
This shows that the quality of the information contained in market prices improves as 
markets become more complete. 
Finally, given the apparent benefits of increasing market completeness, we analyzed 
private investors' incentives to create liquid markets for additional derivatives. We 
found that adding a derivative may lead to (negative or positive) spill-over effects on 
already traded derivatives. As a result of negative spill-overs, private investors may not 
have the right incentives to create the optimal number of liquid markets, and 
government intervention may be needed to reach the welfare-optimum.   31
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Appendix A: Numerical model 
The equilibrium model is solved as a Mixed Complementarity Problem (MCP) in 
Gams. By writing the problem as a MCP, we can simultaneously determine the 
equilibrium prices and production quantities. This formulation will also allow us to 
introduce trading frictions in financial markets, such as a bid-ask spread and extend the 
model to firms with capacity constraints.  
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with s  the state of the world and the indices g and r  indicating generator and retailers. 
 
Call Option 
The call option i  pays  is T  in state s . 
 max( ,0) is s i is TP S T =−  (24) 
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Risk free probabilities 
The risk-free probabilities are chosen such that the expected value equal the price of the 
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